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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
vs. : Case No. 20616 
DEREK ANDREASONf j Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
POINT I 
THERE WAS AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN 
THE JOINT REPRESENTATION OF THE APPELLANT 
AND THE CO-DEFENDANT. 
Point II of appellant's brief raises the issue of the 
denial of appellant's constitutional right to effective assistance 
of counsel. This was due to the existence of a conflict of 
interest between appellant and the co-defendant because they were 
both represented at trial by the same attorney. This issue turns 
on the question of the existence of an actual conflict of interest. 
However, a factor in determining how a reviewing court may assess 
the question of an actual conflict of interest is the trial 
court's failure to make any inquiry into the conflict issue with 
counsel or the defendants due to this joint representation. 
In its brief, respondent cites federal cases that 
describe general situations involving actual conflicts of interest. 
One of those cases, United States v. Benavidez, 664 F.2d 1255 
(5th Cir. 1982), provides: 
All of our previous cases granting relief 
on grounds of actual conflict have involved 
one or more of the following situations: 
(1) the conflict was brought to the trial 
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court's attention at the outset of the 
trial or at the time when the conflict 
first became apparent; (2) one defendant 
has evidence that would have exculpated 
himself but inculpated a co-defendant; (3) 
the prosecution's evidence offered defendant 
a theory under which he could prove his own 
innocence by proving his co-defendant's 
guilt. 664 F.2d at 1259. 
In United States v. Alvarez, 696 F.2d 1307 (11th Cir. 
1983), the court noted that in the absence of an inquiry made 
pursuant to Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure1, 
a reviewing court will be more likely to assume that there was an 
actual conflict of interest. 
Applying the Benavidez standard to this case, the first 
situation is inapplicable because the possibility of a conflict 
of interest was never brought to the trial court's attention. 
The second situation, where one defendant had evidence that would 
have exculpated himself but inculpated a co-defendant, did, in 
fact, exist here. The statements made by Ray Andreason, the co-
defendant and appellant's father, on cross examination fit within 
1. Rule 44(c) provides: 
Joint Representation. Whenever two or more 
defendants have been jointly charged pur-
suant to Rule 8(b) or have been joined for 
trial pursuant to Rule 13, and are repre-
sented by the same retained or assigned 
counsel or by retained or assigned counsel 
who are associated in the practice of law, 
the court shall promptly inquire with 
respect to such joint representation and 
shall personally advise each defendant of 
his right to the effective assistance of 
counsel, including separate representation. 
Unless it appears that there is good cause 
to believe no conflict of interest is likely 
to arise, the court shall take such measures 
as may be appropriate to protect each 
defendant's right to counsel. 
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this catagory.2 j n that testimony, Ray Andreason indicated 
that, after learning of the improper electrical hookup, his first 
reaction was to call the appellant and place the blame on him for 
the offense. (Tr. 481-488). Thus, under this test, there was an 
actual conflict of interest. 
The third situation described in Benavidez is also 
applicable to this case. The prosecution's evidence did offer 
appellant a theory under which he could prove his own innocence 
by proving the co-defendant's guilt. The prosecution's evidence 
in this case showed that there were two improper electrical 
hookups at appellant's business property (Tr. 90-92, 226). The 
co-defendant's seal, which he used in his employment with Utah 
Power and Light, had been used on at least one of these hookups 
(Tr. 74-75). The State's evidence also showed that the appellant 
would have been the beneficiary of the improper hookup (Tr. 79), 
and the value of the electrical power received was more than one 
thousand dollars (Tr. 280). A reasonable theory for appellant's 
defense would be that the co-defendant made the improper hookup 
without appellant's knowledge. The evidence did establish that 
the appellant had his power turned off in the past due to a 
failure to make his payments (Tr. 426, 437, 454). The co-
defendant, appellant's father and an employee of Utah Power and 
Light Company, could have made these hookups to help his son 
financially, or to save the embarrassment of his son having his 
power turned off. 
2. This portion of Ray Andreason's testimony is set out in full 
in appellant's brief at page 16-17. 
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The fact that appellant did not raise such a defense only re-
inforces the existence of an actual conflict. Without the trial 
court inquiring into the potential conflicts and obtaining an 
express waiver of such a conflict, it cannot be assumed that 
appellant was aware that such a defense existed, nor can it be 
assumed that appellant knowingly waived raising such a defense. 
Since there is an actual conflict of interest in counsel repre-
senting both the appellant and the co-defendant, appellant was 
denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Prejudice must then be presumed, Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 
475 (1978), his conviction reversed and a new trial ordered. 
CONCLUSION 
There was an actual conflict of interest between the 
co-defendants in this case. Their joint representation by a single 
attorney resulted in the denial of appellant's constitutional 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. Consequently, this 
court must reverse the appellant's conviction and order a new 
trial. The failure of the trial court to inquire into the poten-
tial for a conflict of interest contributed to the problem here, 
because this court cannot assume that the appellant was aware of 
any conflict of interest or that he waived it without such an 
inquiry by the trial court. In this case, this court should 
adopt a rule similar to Rule 44(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure requiring trial courts to make inquiries into the 
potential for conflicts of interest in cases involving joint 
representation and further advise defendants of their right to 
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individual counsel or take other action as the situation dictates. 
Dated this day of April, 1986, 
G. FRED METOS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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